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1 Introduction 
 
The 1975 Abortion and Sterilisation Act (ASA)1 was the first statute to regulate abortion in 
South Africa. The ASA provided that abortion was illegal. Although the default legal 
position adopted by it appeared to be clearly pro- life, it nonetheless allowed abortion in 
certain circumstances. Although much more restrictive, abortion was also allowed in 
terms of the common law prior to the enactment of the ASA. With the formal advent of 
democracy in 1994, two parallel legal processes pertaining to abortion were 
simultaneously taking place alongside the transition from apartheid. The first process led 
to the statutory legalisation of abortion in 1996 when the ASA was replaced by the current 
statute regulating abortion, namely, the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 
(CTOPA). 2  Unlike the ASA, the CTOPA assured a default legal position that clearly 
favoured a secular, pro-choice view. Its enactment also resulted in the offence of abortion 
being largely decriminalised. Since then it also became more politically correct to use the 
word "termination" instead of "abortion". The second process during the transition led to 
the adoption of a neutral position on the "right to life" clause3 in the interim Constitution4 
which also contained South Africa's first justiciable Bill of Rights. A neutral position, 
because it is tantamount to fence sitting, implies support for either a pro-life or a pro-
choice view but at the same time does not rule out the possibility of support for a 
combination of these opposing views. This neutral position remained unchanged in the 
current Constitution5 in terms of which a right to abortion is not clearly guaranteed and 
can therefore only be inferred from it. The CTOPA and the Constitution both entered into 
force in 1997, and in this order. 
 
This essay will address and attempt to answer the following questions: Given that, during 
apartheid, legislation was already in place in terms of which abortion was possible, was it 
really necessary to introduce a new abortion law? Why was the old law simply not 
amended? What may have motivated, and what was achieved by, the new law 
uncharacteristically coming into operation literally days before a new Constitution? How 
has this new law fared since its inception? Is there any scope in the provisions of both the 
new law and the Constitution for it to be interpreted to protect the unborn? Is there any 
hope that criminal law and constitutional law (public law) can be combined with the 
                                                 
1 Act 2 of 1975. 
2 Act 92 of 1996. 
3 Du Plessis & Corder (1994). 
4 Section 9 of the 1993Constitution. 
5 Section 11of the 1996 Constitution. 
2  
already existing private law protections to provide the unborn with further protection? 
 
The CTOPA did not receive blanket support from South Africans and was also not passed 
by the South African Parliament without controversy. It appears that in 19906 and 19917 
South Africans had held opposing views on the ASA. The 1995 Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Abortion and Sterilisation8 appointed to review the ASA, indicated that 
more "pro-life" than "pro-choice" submissions were received. The pro-choice position 
subsequently adopted by the CTOPA implies that the former may have been discounted. 
The conclusion reached by a reliable, though dated (2003-2006), study also indicated 
that most South Africans may still oppose abortion and view it as "wrong".9 Opposing 
views on abortion appear to be reflective of a larger rift in the broader South African 
society that has not yet quite closed. There can be no denying that the ravages that 
apartheid left behind as a legacy for the majority of South Africa's impoverished people 
included "unwanted" (accidental) children and "backstreet" (illegal) abortions. Although 
the large number of illegal abortions may have been touted as the main motivating factor 
for introducing the CTOPA10, this does not explain why, as recent newspaper reports and 
research studies highlight, illegal abortions continue unabatedly11 and many children are 
still abandoned.12Salient points of some reports which are referred to in this Chapter 
paint a grim picture of abortion that closely resembles a scenario one would expect from a 
country in which it is still a crime and banned! This implies that the CTOPA appears to 
have largely served its intended purpose, but may not be doing so effectively nor 
adequately. Although pro-lifers are not necessarily anti-choice in all cases, the status quo 
implies that the discounting of the (majority) sentiment may have been a contributing 
factor. It may also imply that the adoption of a neutral constitutional position on abortion 
was little more than a convenient strategy to appease a pro-life sentiment, and may have 
had little to do with protecting the life of the unborn. 
 
The  legalisation  of  abortion  may  have  meant  that  abortion  no  longer occupies a 
central position on the current political agenda. While it may therefore be thought that 
the choice of abortion for a contribution to the Festschrift may  only be of mere historical 
value, it is clear from the above questions and current status quo that abortion remains an 
ambiguous and complex topic which still holds much current legal relevance and future 
interest. 
 
The essay is divided into five sections, in addition to the Introduction, to address the 
stated questions.  §2 provides  a brief  overview  of  the  abortion statutes  and  focuses  on  
the  current  abortion  legislation.  The question of "viability", the ability of a foetus to 
independently survive outside the uterus or womb of the mother, forms the focus of §3 
and is also a theme that straddles the essay.  §3 outlines   the   compromising   role, in 
favour of protecting developing life, that viability currently inadvertently already appears 
to play in defining and reducing the legal boundaries of abortion in terms of the CTOPA. 
                                                 
6 Du Plessis (1990) 44-59. 
7 Du Plessis (1991) 339-357. 
8 Nkomo (1995) vi. 
9 Mncwango & Rule (2008) 6 -7. 
10 1See Sarkin (1995) 63. 
11 See Farber (2014) 1 & 3 and Skosana (2014). A 2010 report  (based on a 2008 study) indicated that 48.5% of abortions accessed 
by young women aged 13-19 were obtained at a place other than a hospital or clinic (unsafe).See Reddy et al (2010) 33. 
12 See Blackie (2014). 
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It is contended that there may be more scope than meets the eye in the CTOPA to base a 
right to prevent the abortion of a legally "younger" (as opposed to a medically "older'') 
viable foetus. Such a novel interpretation has the potential to limit a woman's choice to 
abort as from the point of legal viability onwards and thereby prevent an abortion at an 
earlier stage than the medical cut-off point for viability. §3.1 explains how such an 
interpretation of legal viability could be strengthened by the application of the existing 
private law based nasciturus rule in terms of which an unborn is deemed to have already 
been born when it is to its advantage. In typical cases where the nasciturus rule is applied, 
abortion is usually not the contested issue. However, since this rule appears to protect the 
interests of an unborn regardless of its "age", as long as it is subsequently born alive, it is 
contended that it could therefore be invoked to prevent a pregnant woman from aborting 
a foetus as from the point of legal viability or even before this stage if the CTOPA is 
amended, as proposed in §4.1, to reduce the timeframe for abortion on request (demand). 
In both these instances the rule need not be amended nor would it be necessary to accord 
the unborn with legal subjectivity or personality, as has been suggested. As is currently 
the case, any interests accruing to the unborn during the pregnancy ought only to be 
secured with live birth. The application of the rule therefore has the potential to avert an 
abortion, which, if allowed to occur, would deprive the unborn of any such interests and 
negate the rule's very operation. This will also allow for closer co-operation between 
public law and private law, rather than treating them as independent legal silos as is often 
the case. §3.2 provides practical examples pertaining to succession, foetal surgery, 
medical emergencies and active and passive euthanasia to briefly illustrate possible ways 
that the nasciturus rule may be applied to protect legally viable foetuses and protect them 
against being aborted. 
 
§4 examines possible ways forward by exploring various options, such as, amending the 
law (for example, by reducing the existing (extended) timeframe for an abortion on 
request), making adoption more attractive, as well as providing, as alternatives to 
abortion, for the proactive prevention of pregnancies. §5 briefly highlights the 
constitutional challenges associated with controversial CTOPA provisions that have 
resulted in recourse being had to the courts by pro-life parties who clearly are not readily 
going to concede. Although they have met with little success to date, the judgments in 
question did not leave them without hope that the position may change in the future. This 
is especially so since the Constitutional Court, which has hitherto only addressed the right 
to life in the context of capital punishment, has yet to do so in the context of abortion. A 
view was expressed that Christianity may have played a role in the restrictive nature of 
abortion Jaw under apartheid13 until the interim Constitution.14 Although Christianity 
remains a dominant15 religion in South Africa, and this may partly explain why the court 
challenges were essentially initiated by Christian pro-life groups, Christianity, or religion 
generally, appears not to have had any impact on the new abortion and related laws 
which, as will be detailed in Section two and elsewhere, are clearly secular in nature. For 
this reason, and apart from cursory references thereto, the role of religion, or even culture 
for that matter, falls beyond the ambit of this essay. 
                                                 
13 DuPlessis (1996) 74. 
14 DuPlessis (2001) 439-466. 
15 This can be gauged from population censuses taken in 1991, 1996 and 2001, although the latest (2011) census excludes religion 
as a consideration. 
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§6 concludes the essay by highlighting that although a Constitutional Court decision on 
abortion has yet to be written, it may remain necessary to interpret both neutral and 
implicit constitutional provisions in support of the right to abortion. It is contended that 
the reasons for doing so may have little to do with whether life is revered and more to do 
with current socio-economic and fiscal realities. This may be borne out by the fact that it 
was only after 21years of freedom that South Africa recently ratified the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in January 2015. 
 
2 Historical and critical overview of abortion legislation 
2.1 The Common law and the ASA 
Prior to the enactment of the ASA in 1975, abortion in South Africa had not been 
statutorily defined, and guidance had to be sought in the Roman-Dutch common law, and 
case law. The common law had severely restricted abortion and considered it to be a 
crime with only one exception - the defence of necessity.16 The ASA was intended to 
clarify the application of the common Jaw.17 Although the expectation was high that the 
ASA would be a progressive law18, its "liberalisation" did not entail abortion on request 
(demand). It was pointed out that its aim was deemed to be to protect the "potential" life 
of the foetus against being killed.19 The Commission of Inquiry that had been appointed 
by the then apartheid government to review the problem of abortion consisted only of 
White males.20 Unsurprisingly, the ASA applied equally to, and discriminated against, all 
women regardless of their race although it appeared to have discriminated between Black 
and White women given the latter's preferred racial and class hierarchy over all other 
women .21 There was also a stage during its operation when the ASA overlapped with 
other laws that prohibited mixed marriages. This resulted in it being construed22 to be a 
racist Jaw given  that it was possible during this period to justify its use to deprive an 
unborn of life purely on the basis of its "mixed" race. 
 
Abortion remained illegal under the ASA; 23  however, it retained the common law 
therapeutic exception 24  and extended the circumstances for allowing an abortion to 
include eugenic25 and humanitarian26 considerations.27 The ASA contained a conscience 
clause which allowed doctors to refuse to perform an abortion without having to proffer 
any reasons;28 the CTOPA does not contain a similar clear provision. 
 
2.2 The CTOPA 
The Preamble to the CTOPA clearly provides that the right to an abortion cannot be 
                                                 
16 A therapeutic abortion was legally allowed only if the life of the mother was in danger. 
See Hawthorne (1982) 238. 
17 Hawthorne (1982) 238. 
18 Strauss (1968) 459. 
19 See Hawthorne (1982) 252. 
20 Sarkin-Hughes (1990) 373. 
21 Guttmacher et al (1998) 191.See also Rebouche (2011) 7-8. 
22 See DuPlessis (1974) 231. The Immorality Act 23 of 1957 was repealed by the Immorality and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages 
Amendment Act 72 of 1985. 
23 See Section 2. 
24 Sections 3(l) (a) and (b). 
25 Section 3(1) (c). An abortion is permitted if the pregnancy would end in the birth of an infant with a severe mental or physical 
abnormality. 
26 Section 3(1) (d). An abortion is permitted if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. 
27 Sections 3(1) (a)-(e). 
28 Section 9. 
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denied on the basis of race, sex or religion, and that the offence29 of abortion has largely 
been decriminalised by it. Although the Preamble refers to access to abortion, it is of little 
legal value, and such right is also not clear from the text of the CTOPA. 
 
As a secular democracy, what currently sets South Africa apart from all but three other 
countries in Africa,30 where abortion is also legally permitted, is that it was the first 
country in which all women, that is, "any female person of any age"31  (including minor 
girls), acquired the unconditional right to obtain an abortion on request, without 
restriction as to reason, during the first trimester of pregnancy, that is, up to, and 
including, the first 12 weeks of gestation (which is roughly 10 weeks of- pregnancy) as the 
upper limit.32 In the second trimester (from the 13th week up to, and including, the 20th 
week of gestation) abortion is permitted if a continuing pregnancy would pose a risk to 
the woman's mental or physical health (therapeutic considerations), if it would end in the 
birth of an infant with a severe mental or physical abnormality (eugenic considerations), 
or if it resulted from rape or incest (humanitarian considerations). Additionally, and 
controversially, abortion is also available on request during the second trimester, if 
carrying the foetus to term would "significantly affect the social or economic 
circumstances of the woman" (social and economic considerations).33 In the last trimester 
(after the 20th week, or "viability") terminations are only available in very limited 
circumstances and are allowed only if the continuing pregnancy would endanger the 
woman's life or result in a severe foetal malformation or a risk of foetal injury.34 
 
The CTOPA was amended in 200435 and 200836 to make provision for an increase in 
access to abortion by expanding both the pool of trained health care providers (doctors, 
midwives and nurses)37 and types of designated public health facilities (State hospitals 
and clinics) that may now offer free abortion services throughout South Africa's nine 
provinces. Yet, restrained practical access to abortion services continues38, and the grant 
of the right to abortion to a larger group of women, including minors, may have led to an 
increase, rather than an expected decrease, in pregnancies among adolescent girls.39 
There are cultures in which a young girl is only accepted as a woman once she has proved 
her fertility by having a baby.40 
 
Furthermore, abortion is available to all women, whether married, single, major   or  
minor,  at  their  request  and  with  only  their  informed  consent. However, the CTOPA 
does not contain a clear "conscience" clause that allows health care providers to refuse to 
perform an abortion, although such a right can be inferred,41 and may therefore conflict 
                                                 
29 Burchell (2013) 557. See also Carstens & DuPlessis (2009) 587-634. 
30 They are Tunisia, Zambia and Cape Verde. See "The World’s Abortion laws" (2014). 
31 See definition in section 1of the CTOPA. See also §5below for a critical discussion of the implications for minor girls. 
32 Section 2(1) (a). 
33 Sections 2(1) (b) (i-iv). 
34 See sections 2(1) (c) (i)-(iii). 
35 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act 38 of 2004. 
36 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act 1of 2008. 
37 Section   2(2)   indicates   that   providers   performing   the   abortion   include   medical practitioners, trained registered nurses 
and midwives. 
38 In 2012 only 40 per cent of designated abortion facilities were operational. See Ludman (2012). 
39 Mchun u et al (2012) 426-434. 
40 "South Africa: Teenage pregnancy figures cause alarm" (6 March 2007). 
41 Section 6 of the CTOPA provides that "(a) woman who in terms of section 2(1) requests a termination of pregnancy from ... 
[designated providers) ... shall be informed of her rights under this Act by the person concerned ". 
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with provisions in the Constitution that allow for conscientious objection.  Although 
objecting providers, therefore, are not  forced  to  perform  abortions,  they  must  inform  
women  seeking  an abortion of their rights in terms of the CTOPA and provide them with 
related information  to  enable  them  to  make  informed  choices42 and  must  advise 
minors to do so in consultation with their "parents, guardians, family members or 
friends".43 Minors are not obliged to heed this advice and therefore parents may not only 
have no knowledge of the abortion obtained by their minor daughters to begin with, but 
their consent thereto is also not necessary.44 However, the independent choice of minors 
does not relieve parents of their duty nor the State of its responsibility to still take care of 
them in terms of constitutional provisions that may be interpreted to have more to do 
with their economic welfare than the minors' best interests. 
 
2.3 The interim and current Constitutions 
It has been argued45 that the interim Constitution did not deal with abortion because of 
disagreement among its negotiators. In seeking to reach a compromise between the two 
opposing views on abortion, the constitution makers adopted a neutral position on the 
right to life in both the interim and the current Constitutions. Neither Constitution 
therefore expressly provides for the right to an abortion on request. Section 9 of the 
interim Constitution simply stated that "[e]very person shall have the right to life", while 
section 11 of the current Constitution states that "[e]veryone has the right to life". 
 
The African National Congress (ANC) (the then incoming, and still current, ruling party) 
negotiators initially indicated that for them abortion was one of those issues that could 
only be settled in a final Bill of Rights that was drafted by a truly representative body. In 
hindsight, this was not what eventually transpired.46 
 
Several other provisions in the Constitution47 clearly conflict with  the neutral position 
adopted because a pregnant woman is also granted the constitutional right to 
reproductive autonomy  which comes very close to her being afforded a right to abortion 
which overrides the rights of the unborn that she is carrying. Section 12(2)(a) explicitly 
recognises the right to make decisions concerning reproduction as part of the right to 
bodily and psychological integrity and guarantees the reproductive  rights  (construed  to  
include abortion) and health of women.48 
 
The human rights contained in the Bill of Rights are not absolute. Section 7(3) provides 
that they are subject to the limitations contained in section 36, or elsewhere in it. Thus, 
the section 27(1)(a) right to access health care services is dependent on the availability of 
State resources (section 27(2)) and may therefore be limited, in terms of section 36 
(general limitation clause), when these are lacking. 
                                                 
42 Section 5(1). 
43 Section 5(3). 
44 Section 5(2). 
45 See Du Plessis (2001) 440--441. 
46 Du Plessis (1994) 145-163. 
47 For example, Section 9 (equality clause) which provides for protection against unfair discrimination on grounds of, 
amongst others, religion, conscience, and belief, but also includes grounds like marital status, culture, sex, gender and 
pregnancy (sections 9(3) and (4)); section 10 (human dignity);and section 12 (freedom and security of the person) 
48 See Du Plessis (1990) 72-73 for details. 
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It can be inferred from  sections 39(1)(a) and  (b) of  the  Constitution (interpretation 
clause) that South Africa may only be obliged to apply the provisions of international 
United Nations (UN) instruments once it has ratified them. While it signed both the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the ICESCR in 1994, 
and had already ratified the ICCPR in 1998, the South African government only ratified 
the ICESCR as recently as January 2015. While little reliance can be placed on, or further 
guidance obtained from, the provisions of the ICCPR (for example, see Article 6(1) for an 
interpretation contrary to that of section 11 (right to life) of the Constitution), the same 
cannot be said of the ICESCR. It is contended that the reason for the delay in ratifying the 
ICESCR may have been related to the creation of further financial expectations from, and 
strain on, State resources. For example, Article 10(2) of the ICESCR not only provides 
that "special protection" be accorded to pregnant women "during a reasonable period 
before and after childbirth" but that they also be "accorded paid leave or leave with 
adequate social security benefits" during this time. While South African law49 currently 
provides new mothers with four months of unpaid maternity leave, it is up to employers 
to decide whether to offer paid maternity leave or maternity leave beyond four months. 
Thus, although the fact that statutory provision is already made for maternity leave can be 
seen as a positive measure by the State in favour of protecting the life of an unborn, 
Article 10(2) may yet create further financial expectations with the ICESCR's entry into 
force in South Africa in April 2015. 
 
The Constitution does not contain a right to establish a family. However, Article 10(1) of 
the ICESCR appears to accord special status, and Article 23(1) of the ICCPR, special 
protection, for the family. The Constitution also does not explicitly contain any reference 
to the rights of parents or the protection of such rights, but clearly burdens them with the 
financial wellbeing of their children (including pregnant minors), for example, through its 
provision  of a child's right to "family care or parental care" in section 28(1)(b). Such an 
interpretation is supported by the fact that section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution enshrines 
the right of everyone to access "appropriate social assistance" from the State if they are 
unable to support themselves and their dependants. This explains why mothers, who may 
be apprehended for abandoning unwanted children and face a range of criminal charges, 
continue to abandon them, often in the hope that someone will care for them. It is 
inevitably the State that ends up with the financial responsibility of providing support to 
such children through a Foster Child Grant (FCG). The Western Cape Province was 
reported to have the highest rate in the world of babies born with foetal alcohol syndrome 
(FAS).50 Yet, the mothers of babies with FAS, who may have inflicted lifelong damage on 
their children because of heavy drinking during their pregnancies, still opt to give birth to 
their children. While the CTOPA allows women to have an abortion until the end of the 
second trimester of pregnancy for 'social reasons' without subjecting them to a potential 
criminal prosecution, a further financial incentive, the Child Support Grant (CSG), which 
                                                 
49 See Section 25 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
50 Zolotova (2011) 398-399. FAS in South Africa has its roots in colonialism and the apartheid based tot ("dop") 
system. See Larkin (2015) who argues that: "The dop system is one in which employers pay their labourers cheap 
wine, or dops. Today, the dop system is no longer legal in South Africa, but alcoholism remains one of the major 
challenges facing the health services in the Western Cape ... Communities report that alcohol-related trauma, 
exceptionally high rates of TB, child and adult malnutrition, and Foetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) are common in the 
Western Cape." 
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is also provided by the State, may be a  major motivating factor in the decision not to 
abort. While the liberality of the CTOPA may encourage women to fall pregnant and opt 
for an abortion, the CSG, or "womb fee" as it is also commonly referred to at the 
grassroots level, may be seen as a major financial incentive for young girls to fall pregnant 
and not to have an abortion. 
 
A further   conflict is evident   in yet another   important   constitutional provision, 
namely, section 15(1), which provides that "everyone has the right to freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion". This provision appears to be wide 
enough to be invoked by all interested parties who may raise valid objections to an 
abortion. However, section 15 may hold special significance for objecting health care 
providers who can only rely on the CTOPA for an inferred right to object. As 
professionals, they are expected to provide abortion services. This is quite unlike the 
situation of other objectors, who may voice moral objections to, or theorise about 
abortion services, but who can safely• ignore their views in their private lives. However, 
while objecting providers may be able to invoke section 15 or even section 23 (1) (unfair 
labour practice) of the Constitution, especially in cases where women repeatedly have 
'elective' abortions, their right to object may be limited by section 36 when compelling 
medical situations or emergencies necessitate that abortions be performed. 
 
Instead of allowing, and waiting for,  the Constitution to finalise the abortion issue, as the 
ANC claimed should happen, the Constitution was not only enacted after the CTOPA, but 
is moreover expected to provide interpretative guidance with regard to ambiguous or 
conflicting provisions within the CTOPA, and to do so notwithstanding its own conflicting 
provisions in this regard . Women constituted the majority of the members of the 
Committee reviewing the ASA.51 Part of the motivation behind the need to enact the 
CTOPA before the Constitution was enacted may have been based on the fact that at the 
time the struggle for gender equality was still a “stepchild of national liberation".52 In 
hindsight, it is contended that using the window period of opportunity that the transition 
provided may not have been the appropriate time to introduce the CTOPA and may have 
resulted in women being short-changed by it. Although the CTOPA, unlike the 
Constitution, clearly guarantees women the right to an abortion, like the CTOPA, the 
Constitution does not guarantee access to a legal abortion. 
 
The ANC had in several policy documents53 already expressed a pre- defined liberal 
position on abortion and may have been motivated by the neutrality of the interim 
Constitution on abortion to in fact speed up  the process. The formulation of the CTOPA 
must also have been influenced by provisions which favour reproductive rights, for 
example, Article 16(1)(e) of the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of  
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), signed by South Africa in 1993 and ratified by 
it in 1995 without any reservations. There was division on the issue of abortion within the 
ANC itself and therefore the CTOPA was not passed by Parliament without controversy. 
The ANC did not allow its members to vote freely on the Bill according to their 
                                                 
51 See Nkomo (1995) ii. 
52 Andrews (2001) 326-358. 
53 See ANC (1994) and ANC (1995). 
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conscience, but compelled them to vote as a party.54 Given that the ANC, as the majority 
ruling party, clearly did not have to worry about the CTOPA not being passed because of a 
lack of support, one has to question whether doing so meant that it may have harboured 
some doubts or insecurities in this regard. In the light of this, should the fact that many 
South Africans still consider abortion "wrong" not then be taken more seriously since the 
CTOPA has failed to make a difference thus far? 
 
3    The compromise role of viability in defining and reducing the boundaries 
of legal abortion to favour life in terms of the CTOPA 
The ASA did not define a "foetus". The ASA, in the instances that it did permit abortion,  
allowed  it  at  any  stage  of  a  pregnancy,  that  is,  with  no  time restrictions, and 
therefore it appears that viability did not play a crucial role in abortion   legislation   prior   
to  its   legalisation.   It  is   contended   that   with legalisation,  the  reverse  may  in  fact 
be  the  case  because  the  CTOPA  has adopted, and operates within, a convenient 
trimester  approach.   The CTOPA, too, has not defined a “foetus".  Hence, guidance 
regarding the issue of "viability" is to be sought from the medical field. Given that the 
CTOPA clearly makes provision for abortion within restricted  timeframes, it is contended 
that there  does  appear  to be  a  time  (viability)  when  the  CTOPA  itself  can  be 
deemed to oblige the State to step in and protect developing life. Burchell sums up the 
current position as follows: 
 
As a result of the process of conception an embryo is implanted on the wall of the 
maternal uterus. After about six weeks it acquires a recognisably human form (after which 
it is called a foetus) and begins, at 20 weeks [five months), to display signs of life 
("quickening"). By about 24 weeks [six months) the foetus is able to sustain its life 
independently of its mother ("viability"). After about 36 weeks [nine months) it is, by the 
process of birth, expelled from the womb as a human being (as to when, in law, it is 
recognised as a human being.55 
 
Burchell's summary may explain why legally the removal or loss of a foetus before 
viability would be defined as an abortion, and doing so after viability as a premature birth. 
However, from a medical point of view viability is not considered a fixed point in the 
development of the foetus but merely an estimate of its likely survival outside the uterus 
(womb). Given  that traditionally it is medically acceptable that viability can range from 
around 24 to 28 weeks, it is contended that the position in South Africa is currently that 
the CTOPA has legally reduced the traditional medical upper limit from around 28 weeks 
(7 months) as the 'accepted' cut-off point for viability to after 20 weeks (5 months).56 
Viability therefore currently stands at the midpoint between when Burchell proposes it is 
attained (6 months) and what the medical upper limit may deem it to be (7 months). 
Given that abortion is currently only legally allowed, as an exception, after 5 months of 
                                                 
54 Guttmacher et a1 (1998) 193. 
55 Burchell (2013) 557 n 1. 
56 Currently, there is no internationally accepted, uniform gestational age that defines viability, scientific thresholds ranging from 
around 23 to around 27 weeks. See South Australian Perinatal Practice Guidelines Workgroup (2013) which makes the following 
important points: "Infants who are born prematurely at 21 weeks gestation or earlier are not considered viable. Their extreme 
physical and physiological immaturity means that survival is not possible with current technology and expertise. Infants born later, 
but still extremely early, for example between 22 and 24 weeks gestation, may be able to be supported with intensive care, but have 
a high risk of dying despite treatment. This period is sometimes referred to as the 'threshold of viability"'. 
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pregnancy, it is contended that "viability" is, therefore, a factor that may be used to tilt the 
balance of life in favour of an unborn. 
 
3.1 The application of the nasciturus rule to limit a woman's choice to abort 
According to the common law, a person is legally deemed to come into existence at birth. 
Hence, in terms of South African law, legal subjectivity only starts at birth. Legal 
personality therefore begins when the birth is complete, that is, when the child is 
separated from its mother, and is breathing.57  Support for the definition of a "child" as a 
person under the age of 18 is found in both the Constitution58 and the Children's Act.59 
The ASA did not make provision for any ring-fencing of the moment of life. While the 
common law position that legal subjectivity only starts with live birth may have been 
regarded as archaic,60 none of the above laws appear to have had a basis in Christianity or 
any other religion. However, that the law had, during apartheid, not formally accorded 
the foetus any legal status until it was born was probably acceptable, given that the default 
legal position in terms of the ASA was that abortion was illegal and therefore an unborn 
had a greater chance of survival than it would currently have in terms of the CTOPA. 
Protective legal measures exist in both the common law and statutory law to safeguard the 
interests of the unborn. A typical example is the nasciturus rule. However, this rule will 
only help an unborn to secure its interests if it was subsequently born alive. It has been 
pointed  out  that  a  foetus  would  be  disadvantaged  by  the  nasciturus  rule because the 
premise upon which its operation depends, namely, subsequent live birth, will not be 
present because of an abortion .61 The requirement of "live birth" was therefore not 
regarded by all as an insurmountable obstacle and a view was expressed some 25 years 
ago already that the South African law was woefully remiss in providing sufficient 
protection to the unborn and that the time had arrived to consider amending the law. It 
was argued that more protection could be afforded to a foetus by according legal 
subjectivity and personality to it through an extension of the nasciturus rule as a possible 
"preventive protection" measure.62 While conceding that according legal subjectivity and 
personality may be stretching the law too far and may therefore gamer little support, it is 
contended that the private law based nasciturus rule, because it is available to an unborn 
regardless of age or stage of development, may be able to work in conjunction with the 
CTOPA and the (neutral) Constitution in preventing the abortion of a legally viable foetus. 
Furthermore, if the CTOPA is amended so that the period for an abortion on request is 
reduced to the first trimester as suggested in §4.1, the rule could ensure such protection 
even before legal viability. The following examples are further indications that the rule 
could be invoked to prevent an abortion in terms of the CTOPA. 
 
3.3 Practical examples of the application of the nasciturus rule to prevent an 
abortion 
A woman can have a lawful abortion today on request until the end of the 
second trimester of pregnancy. Hypothetically, if an unscrupulous pregnant woman has 
                                                 
57 Carstens & Du Plessis (2009) 588 and 593. 
58 Section 28(3). 
59 Section 17 of Act 38 of 2005. 
60 See Barnard et a/ (1978) 346. 
61 See Du Plessis (1976) 17. 
62 The theory of extending the nasciturus rule as a "preventive protection" measure was proposed in Du Plessis (1990) 49-52 and 
Du Plessis (1991) 339, 348-350 & 353-354. 
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been widowed, and no-one is aware of her pregnancy, nothing legally precludes her from 
circumventing the application of the nasciturus rule in matters pertaining to succession 
by furtively seeking an abortion in order to augment her share of the inheritance. 
However, the outcome could be different where the woman's pregnancy was known and 
the foetus was viable, if the nasciturus rule was utilised. If the CTOPA is amended as 
proposed in §4.1 the abortion could be prevented at an even earlier stage. 
 
There is a clear indication in the CTOPA that a foetus is capable of suffering severe 
physical or mental abnormality63  and may be at risk of severe malformation64  or of 
sustaining injury.65 It can, therefore, be inferred from these provisions, together with the 
Act's determination of gestation or age by reference to periods of time, that viability ought 
to be a factor that could be used to accord a foetus both "mercy" and "dignity". Specialist 
doctors in South Africa are now performing open (intra-uterine) foetal surgery in order to 
avert pain and suffering to a growing foetus, and to give it a greater chance of a normal 
life.66 A pertinent question would therefore be whether the nasciturus rule could be 
invoked by interested parties, like health care providers, to prevent a lawful abortion of a 
(legally) viable foetus in cases like these? 
 
Although an earlier radical "pro-choice" view advocated,67 in the context of 
a mother giving up her life to preserve that of a foetus where it poses a threat to her life or 
health, that such a pregnant woman be afforded the right to refuse emergency medical 
treatment in order to grant her unborn life when an emergency warranted a therapeutic 
abortion, such a situation will be dealt with very differently today. It is expected that if the 
pregnancy (foetus) threatens the life of the woman, a doctor will be duty bound to choose 
"the" life of the mother over "a" potential human life and provide an abortion as an 
emergency service when the woman's life is at stake. The mother's life would be deemed 
the more valuable of the two and the doctor cannot be found guilty of a crime since his or 
her conduct would be justified on the basis of necessity. Although there was no similar 
ground of justification (necessity) in this case, the Court in S v Mshumpa ruled that the 
killing of an "unborn child" did not constitute murder.68 
 
However, it remains to be seen whether the nasciturus rule can be of assistance to an 
unborn to prevent an abortion if an ill, pregnant woman is requesting active (as opposed 
to passive) euthanasia. Active euthanasia is a form of mercy killing and can occur when a 
person helps another to commit suicide. It is tantamount to murder and currently illegal 
in South Africa.69  The unborn is out of the equation because its life does not count till its 
birth, and therefore there ultimately also is only one life at stake. In a recent ground- 
breaking decision in April 2015, the North Gauteng High Court in Stransham- Ford v 
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others70 ruled in favour of a doctor 
                                                 
63 Section 2 (l)(b)(ii). 
64 Section 2 (l)(c)(ii). 
65 Section 2 (l)(c)(iii). 
66 See Cole (2014). 
67 See Barnard eta/ (1978) 349. 
68 In S v Mslwmpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E), the Court ruled that the perpetrators at most may be prosecuted only for an assault on 
the prospective mother. 
69 Killander (2009) 84. 
70 Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice   and   Correctional Services and Others Case Number (27401/15) [20151 ZAGPPHC 230 
(4 May 2015). See also Hartleb (2015). 
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assisted suicide. Given that the decision goes contrary to the existing legal position, the 
Justice Ministry has, not surprisingly, indicated that it would appeal the judgment. 
However, the case appears to suggest that the current legal position may be subject to 
change in the near future. If, and when this happens,  it  may  also  mean  that  an  unborn  
will  be  entitled  to  even  less protection than it currently has. 
 
The position with passive euthanasia is quite different since it is currently not considered 
unlawful.71 For example, the removal of life support may be permitted at the request of 
dose relatives of a pregnant patient who is in a permanent coma and is certified to be 
clinically dead. In such a case the unborn may or may not, depending on the stage of the 
pregnancy, abort spontaneously or survive when delivered. However, notwithstanding the 
fact that the law does not afford an unborn any rights until its birth, the CTOPA does 
appear to provide it with  protection  from the  time of  legal  viability by limiting a 
woman's choice to abort from that point onwards. This position would lend support to a 
court ruling that it will not condone keeping such a woman on life support merely to allow 
an unborn that has not reached the stage of viability or may be far from reaching it to be 
safely delivered, especially if the woman's personal views are unknown. However, with the 
aid of the nasciturus rule, the matter could be viewed differently if a foetus has reached 
legal viability or is very near to reaching it. In such a case, and especially where family 
members may be giving expression to the informal or formal wishes of the woman, and 
are able to substantiate them, it is contended that the "best" interests of the unborn would 
be protected by keeping its mother on life support until it is able to be safely or 
prematurely delivered . However, if the woman has informally during her lifetime, or 
formally through a (living) will, indicated otherwise, this raises two further difficult 
questions: should the wishes of such a brain dead woman count and should the fact that 
the foetus may or may not have reached the point of viability matter? If the nasciturus 
rule is there to preserve the interests of the foetus, and the question is: preserve the life of 
the 'to be born' foetus against the 'death' of the brain dead mother- would (potential) life 
not trump death? In this equation, why should the wishes of the mother be of any value, 
whether known or unknown? Does the nasciturus rule not apply from the moment of 
conception, so viability is not in issue? However, perhaps there is value in the viability 
element combined with the nasciturus rule, to tip the balance in favour of the (to be born) 
foetus? A further thought that comes to mind is: could the nasciturus rule be applied after 
viability to deny a legal abortion? In a recent article, adopting a view which may be more 
in line with the law, McQuoid-Mason indicates that unlawfully and intentionally keeping 
a pregnant brain dead woman alive could result in a criminal charge of violating a 
corpse.72 
 
4 The way forward 
It is contended that the following options could be considered so that an abortion either 
occurs early (and even before legal viability) or is avoided altogether by preventing 
pregnancy and through other legal measures. All options ultimately involve elements of 
choice and accountability. 
 
                                                 
71 Currie & De Waal (2013) 267. 
72 McQuoid-Mason (2014)44-46. 
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4.1 Amending the CTOPA and related laws 
Abortion in terms of the CTOPA is legally available on demand during the first two 
pregnancy trimesters for various reasons. As already indicated, a first trimester abortion 
may occur on request, that is, without having to provide any reason. Although some of the 
second trimester reasons may be  serious, for example, rape; it is contended that none of 
the reasons (humanitarian, therapeutic, eugenic or social and economic considerations) 
that would justify an abortion in the second trimester would justify having to wait until 
such an advanced stage of pregnancy to have an abortion. It is proposed that a possible 
way forward would be to consider amending the CTOPA (and related laws) so that the 
default position would be to allow an abortion on request in the first trimester only; at any 
stage thereafter only cogent medical grounds would afford pregnant women an 
opportunity to make an informed choice to abort. The CTOPA's 'legal' earlier 
determination of viability should remain because it creates a balance between these two 
extremes, favours life, and has the potential to serve as a guide when dealing with the 
application of the nasciturus rule which could be used to protect an unborn from the 
beginning of four months rather than only from the beginning of six months (legal 
viability). 
 
The motivation for the default position to be limited to the first trimester is explained as 
follows. Section 1 of the CTOPA refers to "medical" and "surgical" abortions without 
defining what is meant thereby. A medical abortion occurs through the use of prescription 
drugs and is less physically invasive than a surgical abortion which occurs by means of 
instrumentation. A medical abortion will allow a woman to self-induce an abortion in the 
confines and privacy of her own home with little need for medical supervision. However, 
abortificant drugs are scheduled drugs and not readily available over the counter at 
pharmacies. While approving doctors may provide scripts to obtain such drugs and may 
themselves also dispense them, not all doctors are pro-choice. Although there are "ways" 
for women to obtain such drugs, these .may involve time which is of the essence to a 
pregnant woman carrying a growing foetus. One such way would be if a woman, who 
knows that she is pregnant and who knows that her doctor may not consent to an 
abortion, still goes to her doctor and through, for example, feigning an ulcer, may still 
obtain the same or similar drugs from the doctor or, if he or she does not dispense such 
drugs, a script from him or her to legally obtain it from a pharmacy. 
 
Although a pregnancy test may show a positive result, or a menstrual period may be 
missed which may indicate a pregnancy, providers are usually only able to perform an 
abortion at both private clinics and State institutions when the foetus is over one month 
old. It is contended that both the "mother" and the "baby" become the victims of such an 
abortion when it occurs at this early, yet "late", stage. Furthermore, given that currently a 
surgical abortion may be delayed because it •may only be initiated once a foetus is 
detected, there is no such thing as a "quick" abortion. It is therefore further contended 
that an abortion should be encouraged to occur as early as possible, and preferably 
medically through drugs (because that procedure may be safer and less invasive than a 
surgical abortion), in order to avert both an unborn and its mother any further "pain and 
suffering". This contention is based on the latest research which indicates that clinically 
life may also begin with "brain birth" and which highlights that the human brain begins 
forming three weeks after conception and begins to function in the fifth week after 
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conception.73  Women who have endured an abortion can attest to the physical and 
psychological trauma that invariably follows (especially when the life of the foetus has 
been unnecessarily prolonged) and which they often have to bear alone. Allowing women 
to self-abort and to do so early in the pregnancy will afford them both the dignity and 
privacy which the CTOPA, by giving them alone the choice to an early abortion, must have 
intended to be the case. Support for this view may be found in the Preamble to the CTOPA 
which emphasises choice in the context of an 'early, safe and legal' abortion and section 14 
of the Constitution which guarantees everyone the right to privacy. Research conducted in 
the Western Cape Province highlighted that the prevalence of failed attempts at self-
induced unsafe abortions persisted during the first trimester and resulted in increased 
numbers of second trimester legal abortions. Of the small sample of women, a large 
number were Black and unemployed and had resorted to using herbal products or tablets 
bought from unlicensed providers.74 In 2010, second trimester abortions accounted for 25 
per cent of all abortions.75 
 
Further, it appears that a female prison inmate (a criminal) in South Africa will probably 
stand a better chance of having a safe abortion than a poor black woman living in a 
township who has to resort to an illegal abortion rabortificants. It is currently possible for 
inmates to have an abortion in terms of the CTOPA at State expense albeit only during the 
second and third trimesters but not on request during the first trimester.76 While this 
position would need to be rectified, it in any event appears that the Constitution77, in 
addition to its equality provision (section 9), also permits inmates to consult with, and be 
attended to by, their own private medical practitioners at their own cost. This therefore 
provides women with a loophole, and a means with which to obtain a first trimester 
abortion with a doctor's assistance; and neither could be found guilty of having 
transgressed the CTOPA or the Correctional Services Act. 
 
4.2 Preventing pregnancy and other legal measures 
Is sterilisation a better socio-economic alternative to abortion in South Africa? It is 
contended that depending on the age of the woman, it may or may not be a viable solution 
but that 'implanon', a   new, user friendly contraceptive device introduced in 2014, and 
which has been made freely available, may have taken away the need to consider such a 
drastic step for women  regardless of their age. This is explained as follows. Women use 
contraception as a preventative measure when they do not want children at a particular 
(usually early) stage of their life. Sterilisation, because of its permanency, may be a viable 
solution for older women who already have children. However, sterilisation, while it may 
prevent pregnancies,  does not exclude the risk of contracting deadly diseases, like 
HIV/AIDs (a pandemic in South Africa), and will still require the use of condoms   which   
may   help   in   preventing   the   transmission   of   sexually transmitted infections, 
including HIV, which can pass through the skin of the penis  or  vagina.  Men who fail to 
use condoms may ultimately cost many teenage mothers their lives, when HIV turns into 
full-blown AIDS. The pro-life ASA regulated both abortion and sterilisation.  It may  
                                                 
73 Information obtained from the website of "ZERO TO THREE", a national non-profit organisation. 
74 See Constant et al (2014) 302-305. 
75 Boland (2010) 1-23. 
76 See Regulation 7{9){b) of the Regulations accompanying the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 which were promulgated in 
2004 and amended by the Correctional Services Amendment Act 25 of 2008. 
77 Section 35 (2) (f}{iv). 
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therefore  even  be possible  to construe from the fact that abortion and sterilisation are 
currently separately  regulated78,  and  given  that  sterilisation  has  a  more  permanent 
outcome  whilst a  woman  undergoing  an  abortion  may have  more  children, that the 
CTOPA ultimately also favours the preservation of life. 
 
In 2013, the then Minister of Health expressed the view that young girls are "using 
abortion as contraception",79 which confirmed that abortion had become a form of failed 
contraception in South Africa in spite of a contrary assertion in the Preamble to the 
CTOPA. It also highlights that contraception may not be effective or properly utilised. 
This has led to the introduction of "implanon", an implant that not only prevents 
ovulation, but is effective for three years. Although there is no contraception that can 
claim to be 100 per cent effective, its effect is reversible and it is deemed to be 99.95 per 
cent ef£ective.80 By preventing pregnancy, "implanon" will hopefully allow women better 
reproductive freedom than an abortion. Since the effect of "implanon" is temporary, it 
may therefore be more a more attractive option than sterilisation. Although it will also 
still require the use of condoms to prevent infections, it is certainly a welcome and 
positive step in the direction of reducing abortions. It is therefore a great pity that it was 
only launched in South Africa in 2014 and not 17 years ago when it was first made 
available in Indonesia in 1998 when the CTOPA was barely a year old. 
 
We allow the abandonment and infanticide of babies without seriously considering or 
exploring other viable legal alternatives to abortion. There are many women whose 
careers may have stood in the way of them having children or who may have decided not 
to have children of their own. There are also many women who cannot bear children 
naturally and have to go through great pain and expense to do so through an artificial 
process. There are also many parents who have lost children. Adoption, in 
contradistinction to abortion, may also be permanent. For example, while the outcome of 
an abortion is the permanent loss of life of a "yet to be born" foetus, the outcome of an 
adoption may also be the permanent relocation of a child with a couple who desires the 
experience of parenthood. Adoption is also a viable option for an unmarried prospective 
mother who may have contemplated having an abortion over giving birth to a child out of 
wedlock for fear of stigmatisation or for economic reasons. However, adoption may also 
be a viable option for mothers in cases other than these. Adoption will also allow the 
prospective biological father of such an unwanted unborn who is able to support it, an 
opportunity of fatherhood in ways that the CTOPA will never be able to ass re him. 
Simplifying the complicated process and requirements for legal adoption as set out in 
Chapter 15 of the Children's Act could, for example, provide many people, both locally and 
abroad (inter-country adoption), with the opportunity of parenthood .Unlike the 
nasciturus rule as it currently applies and which does not protect rights unless an unborn 
is subsequently born alive, an adoption order does not terminate any property rights a 
child may have before the adoption. 
                                                 
78 The Sterilisation Act 44 of 1998. 
79 See Halala (2013). 
80 The website medicines.org.uk explains that: "Nexplanon is a radiopaque, non- biodegradable, progestagen-only, flexible implant 
preloaded in a sterile, disposable applicator. Each radiopaque implant contains 68 mg of etonogestrel; the release rate is 
approximately 60-70) µg/day in week 5-6 and has decreased to approximately 35-45) µg/day at the end of the first year, to 
approximately 30-40) µg/day at the end of the second year and to approximately 25-30) µg/day at the end of the third year." 
 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
16  
 
5 A future judicial stance in relation to the status quo 
Given controversial provisions of the CTOPA, which include not requiring parental 
knowledge or "participation" for any type of abortion, it is not surprising that these issues 
were among those raised in judicial challenges brought in relation thereto. 
 
Christian pro-life groups have, in two separate High Court cases decided m 1998 and 
2004, unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the CTOPA. It, therefore, seems 
that there is little point for the pro-life lobby to continue with a legal, or even a 
constitutional, challenge to abortion given that from the point of view of the Constitution 
itself (which "locks in" support for abortion), it will more than likely be unsuccessful. 
During the period of the operation of the interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court in 
its first case, S v Makwanyane, abolished the death penalty.81 It considered the right to 
life in the context of capital punishment and not abortion. Given therefore that there has 
as yet not been a Constitutional Court decision which pertains directly to abortion and 
which provides the last word on it, the abortion issue may not have been decided "once 
and for all", as many believe. However, it was predicted that if the Constitutional Court 
were to take its cue from private law, it would probably not recognise the foetus as a legal 
subject worthy of constitutional protection.82 Having regard to what is implicit in the 
following ruminations on some of the interim Constitution's implications for abortion by 
Mahomed J and O’Regan J, in their separate judgments in S v Makwanyane, such 
prediction may not have been wrong. Mahomed J states that: 
 
[T)he Constitution ...prescribes in peremptory (definite) terms that "every person shall 
have the right to life". What does that mean? What is a "person"? When does 
"personhood" and "life" begin? Can there be a conflict between the "right to life" and the 
right of a mother to "personal privacy" ...and her possible right to the freedom and control 
of her body?83 
 
0' Regan J holds that: 
 
(T]he right to life was included in the Constitution not simply to enshrine the right to 
existence. It is not life as mere organic matter that the Constitution cherishes, but the 
right to human life ... This concept of human life is at the centre of our constitutional 
values.84 
 
In 1998 (the CTOPA came into operation in 1997), Christian pro-life groups 
unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the CTOPA on the ground that it 
violated the right to life of the foetus in Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others 
v Minister of Health and Others.85 McCreath J rejected the challenge on the basis that the 
word "everyone" used in section 11(the right to life) of the Constitution did not include a 
foetus within its ambit and that therefore a foetus was not a bearer of rights (yet he refers 
                                                 
81 5 v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 22. 
82 See Du Plessis (1994)162. 
83 5 v Makwanyane para 268. 
84 5 v Makwanyane para 326. 
85 Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others [1998] (11} BCLR 1434 (T) 1435. 
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to the unborn as a 'child'). Currie & De Waal express the following view regarding the first 
Christian Lawyers case: 
 
[T]he issue of the constitutionality of permissive abortion legislation cannot s1mply be 
reduced to the question of whether the foetus is a person ... the question is whether the 
state has a constitutional duty to protect developing human life ...lf so, the extent of the 
duty must be established.86 
 
As indicated, the CTOPA governs abortions up to and including the point of v1abtlity. 
Given that an abortion thereafter will only be legally allowed in certain exceptional 
circumstances, does this not also imply that the CTOPA therefore can be interpreted to 
mean that the State would be responsible for the welfare and protection of the foetus from 
the time of viability until its birth? Although the first Christian Lawyers case was not 
expected to consider the matter from this angle, it is contended that such a challenge in 
the future is not precluded, and that the possibility that the unborn will be entitled to 
State protection once it has reached the stage of legal viability cannot be ruled out 
entirely. 
 
The outcome of the first Christian Lawyers case did not discourage Christian groups from 
bringing a second challenge to the CTOPA in 2004.87It is contended that while the second 
Christian Lawyers case tmhally also dtd not rule out the possibility of a future challenge 
in other courts, including the Constitutional Court, the 2005 Children's Act may have laid 
any such challenge to rest In this case it was argued that minor girls below the age of 12 
were not capable of giving informed consent, as defined by the CTOPA, without parental 
involvement.  Although the plaintiff's claims were dismissed in this particular case, it 
appeared that the Court, per Mojapelo J, may have left the door open to deny an 
immature minor the right to an abortion without parental involvement.88 However, this 
may not be the case after all, because in 2005 legislation pertaining to the child was 
amended by the Children's Act. Although some of its provisions came into operation 
earlier (2007), all the other provisions, including section 129, only came into force in 
2010. Section 129 nonetheless defers to the CTOPA. The CTOPA, in turn, defers to the 
Constitution which, given its support for abortion as a reproductive right, would probably 
support an interpretation and conclusion requiring no need for parental consent. 
 
Section 129 of the Children’s Act sets the age limit for consenting to medical treatment at 
12 years. However, section 129(1) clearly states that it is "subject to section 5(2) of the 
CTOPA in terms of which "no consent other than that of the pregnant woman shall be 
required for the termination of a pregnancy" (emphasis added). 
 
The CTOPA's definition of "woman" means that even  a minor  girl under the age of 12, 
regardless of her maturity  and capacity, has the right to give confidential permission for 
an abortion to be performed on her without the consent of her parents or guardians. This 
also technically means that a seven- year-old girl (a minor, nonetheless) who menstruates 
                                                 
86 Currie & De Waal (2013) 266. 
87 Christian Lawyers ' Association v National Minister of Health and Others (2004] (10) BCLR 1086 (T). 
88 Christian Lawyers' Association v National Minister of Health [2004]1094 & 1104. 
 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
18  
and is therefore able to fall pregnant can have an abortion regardless of whether or not it 
may be in her "best interests" which in terms of both section 28(2) of the Constitution and 
section 9 of the Children 's Act ought to be 'paramount'. Two South African girls aged nine 
and ten are reported as having given birth in 1966 and 2009, respectively.89 The former 
would not have been able to have an abortion in terms of the ASA but the latter would 
have been eligible in terms of the CTOPA. Thus, a minor, who is not able to possess an ID 
document in South Africa until the age of 16, and who is considered not to have sufficient 
discretion to vote in elections until the age of 18, will be able to have a legal abortion at 
any or whatever age. It therefore does seem that it would be futile for a parent to try and 
stop a minor's abortion through a court challenge in the future. 
 
Hawthorne has argued that the mere existence of the ASA provided a sufficient basis for 
the protection of the rights of prospective fathers.90 However, the CTOPA does not afford 
men any assurance of fatherhood. It 1s irrelevant today whether men, because of their 
maintenance obligations, may want to raise a child by themselves or may be reluctant to 
become fathers If unmarried, it may be understandable that women may want to make 
the decision to abort alone. The fact that the law requires unmarried fathers to contribute 
to the maintenance and upbringing of their children, and the fact that their views are not 
taken into consideration with regard to an abortion, may only be questioned but not 
challenged, given that the CTOPA assures that women alone are to make a choice. It is 
contended that while fathers currently may be unable to influence a woman's decision to 
keep a child, a question that may yet be  open  to challenge is whether men, who do not 
want to be  fathers, will be able to influence a woman's decision so that she in fact has an 
abortion . The latter scenario has  already  had  deleterious  consequences  for  an unborn, 
and the undue "pain and suffering" it must  have endured, when  in  S  v Mshumpa91 an 
unmarried man who did not want to become  a  father  had arranged  for the killing of his 
unborn at 38 weeks when its birth was imminent. 
 
6   Conclusion 
The ASA paradoxically did not confer all rights on an unborn. The CTOPA preceded the 
Constitution and therefore it was not necessary for the ASA to have been repealed by a 
constitutional or judicial challenge. The CTOPA,  in turn, may not necessarily spell the 
death knell for life in all instances because several of its provisions may be interpreted to 
imply that the State may yet be duty bound to protect the unborn from the time of legal 
viability. It appears that it remains both necessary and possible to bridge the gulf between 
competing pro-life and pro-choice perspectives on abortion in South Africa. A future 
review of the CTOPA, and other South African laws affording protection to the unborn, 
should therefore not be ruled out. 
 
The CTOPA may have many shortcomings. The manner in which it has dealt with 
controversial issues may even have backfired to be the very obstacles standing in the way 
of its successful implementation today. It may yet still face a Constitutional Court 
challenge. However, the CTOPA will not be abolished any time soon for reasons that may 
have more to do with fiscal pragmatism on the part of the State than either the welfare of 
                                                 
89 There is a long list of known biological mothers under the age of 11, from as young as five. See ABC News Point (15July 2015). 
90 See Hawthorne (1982) 278. 
91 S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E). 
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the unborn or of the most underprivileged women, or, in the case of minors of all ages, 
their best interests. More than a decade ago we were alerted to the fact that the 'prosperity 
gap' between the 20 per cent rich ('overwhelmingly white') and the 80 per cent poor 
population in South Africa had not been closing fast enough since the advent of 
democracy.92 The CTOPA may justifiably still be viewed as a 'first world developed' law in 
a 'third world developing' country. The fact that South Africa has only very recently 
ratified the ICESCR lends further support to this view. The extended timeframe in terms 
of which abortion on request is currently permitted may justifiably be in need of 
reduction. Yet, realistically, legal abortion has to remain a woman's personal choice until 
the elimination of situations, such as the following: husbands or partners who are abusive 
and poor providers; husbands or partners who unreasonably withhold consent to an 
abortion; and contraception that may fail even when properly utilised. Ultimately, 
whether or not women exercise the choice to have abortion, is a matter of individual, 
cultural and religious conviction and not function of the government or religious bodies to 
dictate. The CTOPA, assuring women of a right to decide not to become mothers, merely 
provided them with a choice. When they do so indiscriminately and unnecessarily delay 
an abortion, it is a strong indicator that their own moral attitudes towards developing 
foetal life may have changed. The mere possibility of a future review of the existing law 
and of a Constitutional Court challenge highlights the fact that the last word on abortion 
in South Africa has yet to be written. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
92 See Du Plessis (2002) 5-6. 
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